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The seer-sucker theory: the value of experts in forecasting
Abstract
People are willing to pay heavily for expert advice. Economists are consulted to tell us how the economy will
change, stock analysts are paid large salaries to forecast the earnings of various companies, and political
experts command large fees to tell our leaders what the future holds. The available evidence, however, implies
that this money is poorly spent. But because few people pay attention to this evidence, I have come up with
what I call the "seersucker theory": "No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, suckers will
pay for the existence of seers."
One would expect experts to have reliable information for predicting change and to be able to utilize the
information effectively. However, expertise beyond a minimal level is of little value in fore casting change. This
conclusion is both surprising and useful, and its implication is clear: Don't hire the best expert, hire the
cheapest expert.
This is not to say that experts have no value they can contribute in many ways. One particularly useful role of
the expert seems to be in assessing a current situation. And although estimates of current status play an
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The Seer-Sucker Theory: The Value of Experts in Forecasting 
J. Scott Armstrong 
 
People are willing to pay heavily for expert advice. Economists are consulted to tell us how the economy 
will change, stock analysts are paid large salaries to forecast the earnings of various companies, and political experts 
command large fees to tell our leaders what the future holds. The available evidence, however, implies that this 
money is poorly spent. But because few people pay attention to this evidence, I have come up with what I call the 
"seersucker theory": "No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay for the existence 
of seers." 
 One would expect experts to have reliable information for predicting change and to be able to utilize the 
information effectively. However, expertise beyond a minimal level is of little value in fore casting change. This 
conclusion is both surprising and useful, and its implication is clear: Don't hire the best expert, hire the cheapest 
expert. 
 This is not to say that experts have no value they can contribute in many ways. One particularly useful role 
of the expert seems to be in assessing a current situation. And although estimates of current status play an important 
role in forecasting, I will deal only with the role of expertise in forecasting change. 
 
Value of Experts: The Evidence 
Many studies have been done on the value of expertise in a given subject area. Most evidence comes from 
the field of finance, but studies have also been done in psychology, economics, medicine, sports, and sociology. The 
relationship of accuracy to expertise in a particular field has been measured in various ways - education, experience, 
reputation, previous success, and self-identification. Expertise, above a very low level, and accuracy are unrelated 
(Exhibit 1) and accuracy may even drop after a certain level. This minimal expertise can be obtained quickly and 
easily. 
For example, in 1955, R. Taft surveyed 81 psychological studies that examined predictions made by experts and 
nonexperts. He concluded that nonpsychologists were more capable of making predictions about people's attitudes 
and behavior. 
 In one typical study done by Austin Grigg, Ph.D.'s, trainees in psychology, and naive subjects 
(undergraduates) each listened to 10-minute interviews with three clients and then predicted how each client would 
fill out three different personality tests. There was no difference in accuracy between the Ph.D.'s and the trainees, 
but both these groups did significantly better than the naive subjects. Thus, a small amount of expertise was useful. 
 More recently, Bernard Levy and E. Ulman asked professional mental health workers, students, and people 
with no mental health experience to distinguish 48 normal people from 48 psychiatric patients by looking at 
paintings the subjects had done. All the subjects' predictions were significantly better than chance, but here accuracy 
did not correlate with experience.
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Exhibit 1 
Some expertise seems to lead to a higher level of accuracy in forecasting change; beyond a 
minimal level, however, additional expertise does not improve accuracy – and there is even 





Low Et Level of Expertise High
 
 The performance of experts and novices in fore casting prices of stocks was first examined by Garfield Cox 
in 1930. He found no advantage for expertise. In 1933 Alfred Cowles examined 255 editorials by Hamilton, an 
editor of the Wall Street Journal who had gained a reputation for successful forecasting. During the period from 
1902 to 1929, Hamilton forecast 90 changes in the market: 45 were correct and 45 were incorrect. Cowles also 
found that a sample of 20 insurance companies did slightly worse in their investments than the market averages from 
1928 to 1931; 16 financial services did slightly worse than the market average from 1928 to 1932; and forecasts in 
24 financial publications were slightly worse than the market average over this same period. Other studies, some 
done as recently as the late 1970s, have reinforced these conclusions. 
 Roy Johnson and B.F. McNeal had 12 health care professionals – 5 staff psychologists, 6 social workers, 
and a physician - predict the length of hospital stay for 379 mental patients over an 18-month period. The scores 
ranged from 63 percent to 86 percent correct. The professionals with more experience in psychology were no more 
accurate. 
 William Avison and Gwynn Nettler examined predictions in nine public opinion polls from 1959 to 1971. 
Experts, as judged from the amount of schooling, were no better at forecasting change. 
 In three studies in which "expert forecasts" were more accurate, the gain was small: 
- A small but statistically significant correlation for a sample of 26 experts in the social and natural 
sciences in forecasting 123 events in their fields was found by Kaplan, Skogstad, and Girshick in 
1950. 
- Similar findings were obtained in 1976 by Wise, who examined 1,556 predictions published in the 
United States between 1890 and 1940. For predic tions related to social, technological, economic, 
and political changes, people with experience in the rele vant field seemed to do slightly better than 
those outside the field. 
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- In a 1971 study by Robert Winkler, sportswriters did a little better than graduate students and 
faculty members in forecasting scores of collegiate and pro fessional football games. The 
bookmakers' fore casts, in turn, were slightly better than those of the sportswriters. 
 Overall, the evidence suggests there is little benefit to expertise. And because improved accuracy shows up 
only in large samples, claims of accuracy by a single expert would seem to be of no practical value. Surprisingly, I 
could find no studies that showed an important advantage for expertise. This evidence does not include every area, 
however, and further studies may show that the seer-sucker theory cannot be generalized. 
 Another possibility is that researchers find it easier to publish evidence refuting than confirming the 
common notion that expertise is useful. However, in light of a 1977 study by Michael Mahoney, this possibility 
seems remote. Mahoney asked 75 re viewers to referee a paper. Two versions of the paper were presented to 
randomly selected subsamples of reviewers. The papers differed only in the results: one version had results favoring 
the common wis dom of the day and the other refuted it. A strong bias was found toward accepting the study that 
agreed with a commonly held hypothesis and rejecting the one that contradicted this hypothesis. 
 
Is Accuracy Irrelevant? 
Assume for a moment that the seer-sucker theory is true - that expertise is useless in forecasting change. Is 
there any rational explanation for why clients continue to purchase worthless information? 
 One explanation is that the client is not interested in accuracy, but only in avoiding responsibility. A client 
who calls in the best wizard available avoids blame if the forecasts are inaccurate. The evasion of responsibility is 
one possible explanation for why stock market investors continue to purchase expert advice in spite of 
overwhelming evidence that such advice is worthless. 
 The avoidance of responsibility is illustrated in a 1978 study by Joseph Cocozza and Henry Steadman. In 
New York, psychiatrists are asked to predict the dangerousness of mental patients - patients diagnosed as dangerous 
are then placed in involuntary confinement. Although numerous studies have shown that psychiatrists cannot predict 
who is dangerous, the expert's diagnosis was accepted by 87 percent of the courts in this study. Cocozza and 
Steadman suggest that their finding may illustrate a belief in magic - that secret knowledge of the specialist can 
control the unpredictable. The expert advice seems to relieve the court of further responsibility. 
 Cases involving risk and uncertainty seem most likely to lead to avoidance of responsibility. An example is 
provided in a study of long-range forecasts of bed requirements for six Michigan commu nity hospitals. Clients were 
satisfied only when the forecasts matched their preconceptions. When differences arose, the hospital administrators 
followed their preconceptions anyway, ignoring the advice of experts. The preconceived forecasts exceeded the 
experts' forecasts for five of the six hospitals and led to decisions that resulted in a 50 percent oversupply of beds. 
 
Ineffective Learning by Seers 
"Expertise … breeds an inability to accept new views." - Laski (1930) 
The continued inclination for people to consult expert advice has been the subject of much study. In 1948 
B.F. Skinner experimented with a pigeon in a cage. Food was given to the pigeon on a random time schedule. What 
happened? The bird concluded that a counterclockwise movement produced the food since it was doing that the first 
time food appeared. It repeated this behavior whenever it was hungry. This initial learning proved to be highly re-
sistant to change, even though it had absolutely nothing to do with the appearance of food. 
In 1958 Lloyd Strickland found that people do a good job of simulating pigeons. He had subjects act as 
managers of two subordinates. whom I will call Stan and Ned. The manager could see Stan's work and communicate 
with him easily. Communication with Ned was poor. However, both Stan and Ned produced the same amount and 
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quality of work. The manager trusted Ned but thought Stan required constant supervision - he had concluded that his 
management efforts were responsible for Stan's output. 
 In a more recent study, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky discussed a flight school training pro gram in 
which trainers adopted a recommendation from psychologists that they use only positive reinforcement - they 
praised successful work and said nothing otherwise. After a time the instructors concluded that positive 
reinforcement did not work; when they praised someone for successfully completing a series of complex maneuvers, 
the trainee would often do worse the next time. That happens because learning involves mistakes. A student cannot 
consistently perform well - an exceptionally good trial will usually be followed by a more average trial, and 
conversely for an exceptionally poor trial. The flight school trainers noticed this phenomenon and attributed it to 
their actions. As a result, they "learned" that what works is punishment for bad behavior (because the odds are that 
the next trial will be better). Rewards, they concluded, just lead to overconfidence of the learner. 
  In these studies, subjects first are assuming that their own actions control the situation. (This effect shows 
up even in studies of gamblers.) Second, they are looking for evidence to support their hypotheses; that is, they are 
looking for confirming evidence and avoiding disconfirming evidence. This latter phenomenon can occur even in 
the absence of any notion of control or emo tional involvement, as shown in the following experiment. 
  P.C. Wason presented subjects with a three number sequence: 2,4,6. The subjects were told that this 
sequence had been generated by a rule that the experimenter had in his head. The subjects were then asked to learn 
the rule by generating additional three-number sequences (e.g., 8,10,12). After each try, the experimenter told the 
subject if the new sequence agreed with the rule. The subject could generate as many three-number sequences as she 
wished; when she felt confident of the rule, she wrote it down. 
  The correct rule was "three numbers in increasing order of magnitude," that is, a < b < c. Despite its 
simplicity, only about 25 percent of the people tested discovered the correct rule. Subjects usually selected a 
hypothesis (e.g., "add two to each successive number") and looked only for evidence to confirm this hypothesis - 
they did not attempt to refute it. In other words, most people refuse even to entertain the possibility that they are 
wrong! 
 The story gets worse. Subjects who wrote the wrong rule were allowed to try again - to generate additional 
sets of numbers to obtain more evidence. About half these subjects continued to search for confirmation for the rule 
they had been told was wrong. 
 It is not clear whether subjects failed to accept disconfirming evidence because they were unable or be-
cause they were unwilling. When asked how they would find out whether their hypothesis was wrong, however, few 
recognized the need to look for dis confirming evidence by generating a sequence of numbers inconsistent with their 
hypothesis. 
 Is Wason correct that people avoid disconfirming evidence? If you believe "yes," I can present confirming 
evidence to make you happy. If you believe "no," I can give a prima facie argument and you may get upset at me. So 
I leave it to you to seek disconfirming evidence. 
 The evidence just cited, however, implies why one might expect expertise to reduce accuracy (as suggested 
by the dotted line in the chart on page 20). The greater one's feeling of expertise, the less likely that disconfirming 
evidence will be used. Loren Chapman and J.P. Chapman studied this issue by asking 32 subjects with high 
expertise to examine data from homosexual and heterosexual subjects. The information was contrived so that there 
were no relationships among variables that previous literature had found to be irrelevant. Nevertheless, the 
practicing clinicians saw the relationships that they expected to see (which, incidentally, were the same invalid 
relationships expected by a group of nonexperts), and they had great difficulty seeing valid relationships even when 
these were dramatic. In a related study, George Strickler found that although people with high expertise re jected 




Salvaging the Expert 
The seer-sucker theory implies that clients will continue to depend upon experts. It is important, then, to 
consider whether experts can improve their ability to forecast change. The prospects are not good; evidence 
reviewed by Nisbett and Wilson shows that experts are often unaware of how they make judgments and predictions. 
For example, a 1964 study by E.C. Webster showed that decisions in employment interviews are typically made in 
the first 30 seconds of the interview. Moreover, the reasons for the decision are not usually understood by the in-
terviewer. 
 Still, there is hope. Detailed instructions for improving judgmental forecasting are provided by Hillel 
Einhorn and Robin Hogarth, and additional suggestions are given in my book, Long-Range Forecasting. Probably 
the key is to make an active search for disconfirming evidence. Without this search, disconfirming evidence is  often 
ignored, mis interpreted, or misused. 
 The advice to seek disconfirming evidence is not new - it is the principle behind "objective" scientific 
experiments. Unfortunately, it is not often used even by scientists, and training does not seem to help. In a study 
using Wason's 2-4-6 problem, Mahoney and DeMonbreun found that the aversion to disconfirming evidence is just 
as prevalent among physical scientists as it is among psychologists. 
 I have recommended an old solution for the problem of finding disconfirming evidence. The method of 
multiple hypotheses, first suggested by T.C. Chamberlin in 1890, can be used to change one's role from advocate of 
a particular belief to arbiter 
among various competing viewpoints. When using multiple hypotheses, disconfirming evidence for one 
hypothesis could be confirming evidence for another hypothesis. 
 Although experts are poor at forecasting change, this does not mean that judgmental forecasting is useless. 
However, since all available evidence suggests that expertise beyond an easily achieved minimum is of little value 
in forecasting change, the most obvious advice is to hire inexpensive experts. Also, look for unbiased experts - those 
who are not actually involved in the situation. Finally, there is safety in numbers. Robin Hogarth has suggested 
using at least three independent experts and preferably six to ten! 
 The conditions under which the seer-sucker theory holds are not well known - it may or may not apply to 
all areas of forecasting. However, in view of the evidence, it seems wise to put the burden of proof upon the experts 
to show that their expertise in a given area is valuable. 
 
Further Reading 
Armstrong, J. Scott, Long-Range Forecasting: From Crystal Ball to Computer. New York: Wiley- Interscience, 
1978. 
Avison, William R. and Nettler, Gwynn, "World views and crystal balls," Futures, 8 (1976): 11 - 21. 
Chamberlin, T.C., "The method of multiple workinghypotheses." Science, 148 (1965): 754 -759. Reprinted from 
Science, 1980. 
Chapman, Loren J. and Chapman, J.P., "Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic 
signs," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 74 (1969): 271 - 280. 
Cocozza, Joseph J. and Steadman, Henry J., "Prediction in psychia  try: An Eexample of misplaced confidence in 
expert s," Social Problems, 25 (1978): 265 -276. 
Cowles, Alfred, "Can stock market forecasters forecast?" Econometrica, 1 (1933): 309- 324. 
 6
Cowles, Alfred, "Stock market forecasting," Econometrica, 12 (1944): 206- 214. 
Cox, Garfield V., An Appraisal of American Business Forecasts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. 
Einhorn, Hillel J. and Hogarth, Robin M., "Confidence injudgment: Persistence of the illusion of validity," 
Psychological Review, 85 (1978): 394- 416. 
Griffith, J.R. and Wellman, B.T., "Forecasting bed needs and recommending facilities plans for community 
hospitals," Medical Care, 17 (1979): 293- 303. 
Grigg, Austin E., "Experience of clinicians and speech characteris  tics and statements ofclients as variables in 
clinical judgment," Journal of Consulting Psychology, 22 (1958): 315-319. 
Hartsough, W. Ross, "Illusory correlation and medicated association: A finding," Canadian Journal of Behavioral 
Science, 7 (1975): 151- 154. 
Hogarth, Robin M., "A note on aggregating opinions," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21 
(1978): 121-129. 
Johnston, Roy and NcNeal, B.F., "Statistical vs. clinical prediction: Length of neuropsychiatric hospital stay," 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 72 (1967): 335 -340. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, A:, "On the psychology of predic tion," Psychological Review, 80 (1973): 237 - 251. 
Kaplan A., Skogstad A.L. and Girshick, M.A., "The prediction of social and technological events," Public 
Opinion Quarterly ,14 (Spring 1950): 93- 110. 
Langer, Ellen J. and Roth, Jane, "Heads I win  , Tails it's chance: The illusion of control as a function of the 
sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task," Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 32 
(1975): 951-955. 
Laski, Harold, "Limitations of the expert," Chemical Technology, 4 (April 1974): 198 -202. Originally from 
Harper's, 1930. 
Levy, Bernard I. and Ulman, E., "Judging psychopathology from paintings," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 72 
(1967): 182-187. 
Mahoney, Michael J., "Publication prejudices: An experimental study of confirmatory bias in the peer review 
system," Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1 (1977): 161 -175. 
Mahoney, Michael J., and DeMonbreun, B.G., "Psychology of the scientist: An analysis of problem- solving bias," 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1 (1977): 229- 238. 
Nisbett, Richard E., and Wilson, T.D., "Telling more than we can lnow: Verbal reports on mental processes." 
Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-259. 
Skinner, B.F., "Superstition in the pigeon," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38 (1948): 168 - 172. 
Strickland, Lloyd H., "Surveillance and trust," Journal o f Personality, 26 (1958): 200- 215. 
Strickler, George, "Actuarial, naive clinical, and sophisticated clinical prediction of pathology from figure 
drawings," Journal of Consulting Psychology, 31 (1967): 492- 494. 
Taft, R., "The ability to judge people," Psychological Bulletin, 52 (1955): 1- 28. 
 7
Wason, P.C., "On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task," Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology  12 (1960): 129-140. 
Webster, E.C., Decision Making in the Employment Interview. Montreal: Eagle, 1964. 
Winkler, Robert L., "Probabilistic prediction: Some experimental results," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 66 (1971): 675-685. 
Wise, George, "The accuracy of technological forecasts, 1890-1940," Futures, 8 (1976): 411- 419 . 
 
 
